Does Japanese trade in manufactured goods differ from the rest-of-the world average and from the U.S.? We use a simple industry-level gravity model and 1981-1998 data to answer this question. We construct a measure of normalized imports by dividing bilateral industry-level imports by the importer's aggregate absorption and the exporter's industry output. We find that Japan imports less than other countries, but also exports less than other countries.
Introduction
Japan is one of the world's great trading nations, accounting for 7.5% of world merchandise exports in 1999 2 . It is also one of the world's great savers, with a cumulated current account surplus of over 1.6 trillion dollars since 1977 3 . Japan's export success combined with its frugality means that it runs large trade surpluses, most notably with the United States, and these surpluses have in the past been a source of political tension between the U.S.
and Japan. Many in the U.S. have claimed that Japan artificially keeps out U.S. exports while taking advantage of the open U.S. market (see, for example, Johnson et. al. 1989 ).
While such mercantilist thinking makes little sense to economists, the large and persistent trade imbalances between the U.S. and Japan have been of interest to researchers, including Lawrence (1987) , Leamer (1988) , Saxonhouse (1989) , and Harrigan (1996) . Most of the earlier literature on Japan's openness looked at the mid-1980s, when the dollar was exceptionally strong and U.S. manufacturing was struggling as a result. In this paper we return to the question of Japan's openness, and ask, how does Japan's trade differ from "normal"? We define "normal" with reference to a simple and flexible model of bilateral trade, the gravity model, which has been widely used by trade analysts. Using the model, we perform a detailed but straightforward analysis of industry-level trade and production for a group of OECD countries between 1981 and 1998, and reach some surprising conclusions:
1. Japan does import less than most countries, including the U.S... 2. ...but Japan also exports much less than most countries, including the U.S.
3. Focusing on the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, we find that after the mid-1980s, Japan's relative export performance has been consistently weaker than that of the U.S.
4. As a result, far from finding evidence of Japan being closed to U.S.
exporters, we find that the U.S. is comparatively closed to Japanese exporters.
Our results have important implications for the policy debate. Many analysts (most notably Svensson, 2001 ) have argued that Japan needs a large nominal depreciation of the yen to rescue it from deflation. Such a nominal depreciation would lead to an at least temporary real depreciation, which would boost net exports to the U.S. The political risks of pursuing a weakyen policy are among the excuses given by Japanese policymakers for not adopting Svensson's proposal. Our analysis suggests that such an adjustment is warranted by the fundamentals of supply and demand for industrial production in the two countries, since in a well-defined sense the U.S.
imports "too little" from Japan while Japan imports "too much" from the U.S.
Methodology
Nobody is surprised that Germany exports more manufactured goods than Uganda, nor does anybody suggest that Saudi Arabia's trade surplus in crude oil is due to unfair Saudi restrictions on imports of oil. Similarly, no one thinks that the small volume of imports by Iceland compared to France is due to greater French openness. The perceived normalcy of such trade patterns is rooted in basic notions of supply and demand: Germany exports a lot of manufactured goods because it produces a lot of manufactures; Iceland doesn't import much because it has a small GNP; Saudi Arabia doesn't import oil because it doesn't need any, etc.
We believe that such common-sense reasoning can be applied to more subtle questions about trade patterns. Since the purpose of our paper is to see if Japan's trade is "different", we need a benchmark for "normal" trade. We begin with an extremely simple benchmark for imports: Equation (1) states that the value of imports is proportional to the exporting country's output, with the factor of proportionality given by the importer's country size. Microfoundations of (1) as the equilibrium of a free-trade model are available from Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Eaton and Kortum (2002) , and others, but the economic logic could not be simpler: imports depend on supply (exporter output) and demand (importer size). Re-writing
(1) slightly gives normalized imports ˆi
where A c is country c's aggregate absorption (GDP minus the current account surplus) and k is a constant (equal to the inverse of world GDP).
Note that by controlling for the level of industrial output, equations (1) and (2) implicitly take account of anything that influences output, such as relative factor supplies, technological differences, and economic policy. far from all their other trading partners). As shown by Harrigan (2002) among others, the effects of relative and absolute distance in a standard gravity model can be captured very simply with country intercepts and information on distance:
where the γ's are coefficients on indicator variables for country c as an importer and country d as an exporter respectively, and σ is the elasticity of trade with distance.
A final consideration is that (3) implicitly asserts that the volume of trade is the same for all goods. This is obviously an oversimplification, since some goods and services are nontradeable (restaurant meals, hotel rooms) while others are highly traded (transport equipment -see below for evidence on this). A simple (if ad hoc) way to account for such product-level heterogeneity is to introduce product-specific intercepts γ i into (3):
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As discussed in Harrigan (1996) , the product-specific intercepts γ i can be derived from a model of differentiated goods and home bias in demand, where the degree of home bias differs by products. In the absence of product-specific intercepts, (3) can be summed over industries i to give the aggregate gravity equation which has served as the basis for innumerable studies. As we show below, however, there are big differences across industries in the share of goods that are traded internationally, suggesting that aggregate gravity equations are misspecified.
Equation (4) has two interpretations. The first is that equilibrium imports depend not just on importer size and exporter output but also on product characteristics and geography. The second interpretation is purely descriptive, and regards the intercepts γ and the distance elasticity σ as reduced form parameters that describe how actual imports differ from the free-trade benchmark given by (2). Such differences might be due to geography, national trade barriers, comparative advantage, or any other unmeasured influences on trade which are country or product specific.
An alternative way of describing deviations from the free-trade benchmark is to add industry and country-pair intercepts to (2):
Equation (5) does not include a control for bilateral distance since such effects are controlled for by the country-pair intercepts. It is more general than (4) in the way that it allows bilateral factors to influence trade.
Data analysis
Our approach in the rest of the paper is to use equations (4) and (5) as a basis for discovering how Japan's trade differs from that of the rest of the world. This is a strictly reduced form, descriptive question, and we are not interested in any hypothesis other than "is Japan different?" This is a modest goal, but a sensible answer to this question must precede any more in-depth analysis of Japan's trade performance.
We use a large database on industry output and bilateral imports, primarily within the OECD, from 1981 to 1998. The data is assembled by the World Bank, and is available from their website 4 . Our study builds on the work of Harrigan (1996) in two ways: first, we include measures of distance in (4), and second, we look at a long time series rather than a single year (Harrigan (1996) looked only at 1985). We estimate (4) and (5) using least squares, ignoring any endogeneity between trade, output, GNP and any other unmeasured variables for the simple reason that our questions are reduced form rather than structural questions. China. Figure 1 shows that the sample includes between 60 and 75 percent of Japan's trade in manufactured goods for most of the sample. The figure   also illustrates the growing importance of China as a source of imports, but not as an export destination. Table 2 shows our first major finding, which is the great heterogeneity across sectors in the share of industry output that is traded. The table reports total bilateral imports within a group of countries divided by total gross output within the same group; since the ratios exclude imports by countries for which we have no output data, it is biased down as a measure of total trade. There is also a clear upward trend in tradeability in most sectors between 1981 and 1993 (1997 is not comparable because of missing data for three large countries). For our purposes, though, the main point of Table 2 is heterogeneity: countries may differ in their aggregate trade-GDP ratio merely due to a different composition of output. Table 3 shows our estimates of equation (4) controlling for country size, industry output, bilateral distance, and industry fixed effects, Japan imports much less than the U.S. does, but also exports much less than the U.S. On the import side, Japan's openness to imports is around 40 percent of the U.S. level, with not much change over the sample.
As an exporter there is a striking trend: in the mid-1980s, Japan was exporting about 60 percent as much as the U.S., but this relative success deteriorated steadily until, by 1998, Japan was exporting just a quarter as much as the U.S.
As an aside, Table 3 contains some surprising results on the importance of distance for trade. The distance estimates are illustrated in Figure 4 , and show no trend: the elasticity of trade with respect to distance is -1.25 in the latter half of the 1990s, and this is not significantly different from the level in 1981. So much for the death of distance. Table 3 is striking evidence that, after controlling for country size, Japan in each year of the sample. Equation (5) is estimated separately each year using all available data for that year. The table reports the difference between the fixed effect for U.S. imports from Japan and the fixed effect for Japanese imports from the U.S., λ US,Japan -λ Japan,US ; this is then transformed by exponentiating the difference and subtracting one to give the proportionate difference between U.S. imports from Japan and Japanese imports from the U.S. The null hypothesis of equal bilateral openness is tested using a t-test, and the results are graphed in Figure 6 . Strikingly, in no year is Japan less open to the U.S. than the U.S. is to Japan. The point estimates for the mid-1980s suggest that Japan was slightly less open to the U.S. than vice versa, but this difference is never statistically significant. A decade later, however, the point estimate is that the U.S. is half as open to imports from Japan as Japan is from the U.S., and this difference is statistically significant from zero at the 10% level. In short, controlling for industry output and country size, the U.S. runs a trade surplus in manufactures with Japan! This is not a result that sits easily with the raw data of Figure 5 , which shows a large and persistent bilateral U.S.-Japan trade deficit in manufactures. What accounts for our results? Two things:
1. Japan has a manufacturing sector which is larger as a share of GDP (24 percent in 1988) than the U.S.'s (16 percent). This means that Japanese supply of manufactured goods is proportionately larger than U.S. supply.
2. Japan has large and persistent current account surpluses (3 percent of GDP in 1998), while the U.S. has large and persistent current account deficits (-2.5 percent). This means that the U.S. has a proportionately larger demand for manufactured goods than does Japan.
These two factors together mean that normalized U.S. imports from Japan are larger than normalized Japanese imports from the U.S. Actual U.S.
imports as a share of normalized imports are smaller than Japanese normalized imports as a share of actual imports, and this is what accounts for the results showing a "normalized" U.S. manufacturing trade surplus with Japan.
Conclusions
This paper has addressed the question of its title using a lot of data and a little bit of economics. We defined normalized imports as bilateral imports adjusted for supply (exporter output) and demand (importer absorption).
Normalized imports are equilibrium imports in a free-trade model of trade in differentiated goods such as that developed in Helpman-Krugman (1985) , but the motivation for such a normalization is nothing more than basic supply and demand.
Our results are striking. We confirm the conventional wisdom that Japan imports relatively little, and verify the less-well known fact that Japan exports relatively little -indeed, compared to the U.S., Japan's export performance has been deteriorating for more than 15 years. Turning to the perennially contentious U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, we find that Japan is more, not less, open to imports from the U.S. than the U.S. is to imports from Japan. (5), reporting the difference between the fixed effect for US imports from Japan and the fixed effect for Japanese imports from the US. The t-statistic tests the null that the difference is zero.
